This work group is charged with identifying and taking swift action in the event of a major disease outbreak or natural or manmade disaster, including the deliberate use of explosives, biological or chemical agents, or radionuclear material. Tabletop training and exercises in public health well in advance of the event are essential for ensuring preparedness. Topics might range from mass gathering issues through medical management and fatality management.
Mass gatherings and public health: The experience of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games (Chapter 6 Public health prepardness for incidents involving the potential deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radionuclear material. ). Tsouros AD, Efstathiou PA (Eds). Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2007 http://www.euro.who.int/document/e90712.pdf
Flynn M. Counter disaster planning for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. NSW Public Health Bulletin 2000;11:140-2.
Hanna, JA. Emergency preparedness guidelines for mass, crowd-intensive events. Ottawa: Emergency Preparedness Canada, 1995
Hauer J. Olympics 2000: preparing to respond to bioterrorism. Public Health Rep 2001; 116(Suppl 2):19-22.
Mean F, Ammon CE. How to handle an international sports event in the context of SARS epidemic: the hygiene and security plan elaborated for the Montreux Volley Masters 2003, Switzerland. International Congress Series 2004;1263:826-9.
Sharp TW, Brennan RJ, Keim M, Williams RJ, Eitzen E, Lillibridge S. Medical preparedness for a terrorist incident involving chemical or biological agents during the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. Annals of Emergency Medicine 1998;32:214-23.
| Sydney 2000 Olympics: Counter disaster planning |
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“Although relatively rare, mass gatherings have been associated with significant morbidity and death. Examples include crowd crushes as Hillsborough Stadium in the United Kingdom, the collapse of a pedestrian bridge at the 1997 Maccabiah Games in Israel, and the terrorist activities at the Munich Games in 1972. The blue glass memorial, inscribed in English and Hebrew, on the ‘Munich XX Olympiad’ solar light tower located on the Olympic Boulevard at Homebush Bah, serves as a reminder of the potential for non-accidental disasters to be superimposed on the complexities inherent in planning for such an event.” Source: Flynn M. Counter disaster planning for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. NSW Public Health Bulletin 2000;11:140-2. |
| Sydney 2000 Olympics: Bioterrorism response protocols |
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In preparation for the Games, the Centre for Infectious Diseases and Microbiology Laboratory Services developed procedures for the culture and identification of infectious bacterial agents known to be potential agents of bioterrorism. These include Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Brucella melitensis (brucellosis), Yersinia pestis (plague), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), and Burkholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis). Procedures were established for the management of a bioterrorism-related outbreak, and for communication between relevant agencies, including the Australian Defence Force, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, the NSW Police Forensic Services, the NSW Fire Brigade, and the NSW Department of Health. Source: James G, Yuen M, Gilbert L. Laboratory investigation of suspected bioterrorism incidents, NSW, October 2001 to February 2002. NSW Public Health Bulletin 2003; 14:221-3. |
| Sydney 2000 Olympics: Disaster preparedness |
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“The heart and soul of the entire Olympic monitoring system was a very sophisticated surveillance system put in place by the New South Wales Department of Health, and that involved a host of information being disseminated on a daily basis. The Public Health Network was their normal reporting system, enhanced for the Olympics. They used information form the World Health Organization to learn about events worldwide to assess whether anything unusual occurred in another country and to see whether it surfaced in Australia. They did environmental monitoring, and then Sydney Organising Committte for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) had their own medical system within the fence of the village…. The officials held daily briefings and sorted through the data from the previous 24 hours to detect any patterns that might have shifted…. They also looked at what was going on inside the fence (e.g., any patient contacts that occurred in the Olympic Village) to see whether there were any trends among athletes and visitors. The public health investigation teams were mobilized rapidly if they found evidence of suspicious activity within the village. Source: Hauer J. Olympics 2000: Preparing to respond to bioterrorism. Public Health Reports 2001;116 (Suppl 2):19-22. |