Containment of Wild Poliovirus stocks - Final Report of the UK Process

The Purpose

Certifying the world polio-free requires not only stopping the circulation of wild poliovirus in human populations, the only natural reservoir, but also minimizing the risk of an accidental or intentional reintroduction of wild poliovirus into the community from a laboratory or vaccine production site. The WHO global action plan for laboratory containment of wild polioviruses aims to identify laboratories worldwide that store wild poliovirus and potentially infectious materials, and ensure that those materials are handled under appropriate biosafety conditions after eradication. Completion of all pre- and post-eradication containment measures is a prerequisite of global certification of polio eradication. That the last case of smallpox actually occurred as a result of a laboratory containment failure in Birmingham, England in 1978, one year after global eradication of smallpox, serves as an important reminder of the need for effective containment.

• United Kingdom National Report on Phase I activities for the laboratory containment of wild polioviruses Final report of the UK process (PDF, 434 KB)
  
  
• Annex 3: BSL-2/polio biosafety requirements BSL-2/polio consists of the standard BSL-2 requirements as described in the WHO Laboratory biosafety manual with additional specific requirements for wild poliovirus (PDF, 202 KB)
  
  

Last reviewed: 3 June 2008